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Julius G. Getmant
There is a widespread perception that our judicial system needs
changing. It is expensive, unnecessarily technical, intrusive on private
relations, and it gives unfair advantage to the wealthy and powerful.
Labor arbitration, by contrast, is frequently pointed to as the paradigm
of private justice.
It is understandable that labor arbitration is widely admired. When
it functions properly it achieves in an impressive fashion the goals by
which any system of dispute resolution should be measured. These are:
(1) Finality. Once decided, are cases likely to be retried or appealed?
(2) Obedience. Are the decisions put into effect or are they rendered
meaningless by subsequent refusals to carry them out?
(3) Guidance. Do the decisions provide necessary guidance to the
parties involved in the dispute? Can they subsequently structure be-
havior in a reasonable fashion and avoid future litigation?
(4) Efficiency. Are the majority of disputes settled without a formal
hearing? When cases are tried, are the procedures adequate, flexible,
and suited to the particular issue? Are the benefits achieved from the
system economical compared to the costs?
(5) Availability. Is the dispute-resolution machinery routinely avail-
able without undue expense to people whose behavior is governed by
the system, and are they provided with adequate representation?
(6) Neutrality. Do the decisionmakers avoid favoritism and bias for
one side or another?
(7) Conflict Reduction. Does the entire process, including the adjudica-
tion, lead to more amicable relations and contribute to mutual respect
among the potential disputants?
(8) Fairness. Will the disputes be resolved in a way that appropriately
recognizes the interests of the various parties likely to come before the
system?
* Professors Bruce Ackerman, Owen Fiss, Dan Freed, Geoff Hazard, Bernie Meltzer,
Frank Sander, Alan Schwartz, Dean Harry Wellington, and Gerald Aksen, General Counsel
of the AAA, all made useful criticisms of an earlier draft. With such able assistance,
it is remarkable that errors of form and substance probably remain for me to take
responsibility for. The Yale Law Journal has my special thanks for its help. David
Kadish, a third-year Yale Law student, was of invaluable assistance in researching this
article.
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Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution
The perception that labor arbitration successfully achieves these
various purposes has led some commentators to the erroneous con-
clusion that it offers a technique for dispute resolution that can be
routinely applied, with only minor adjustments, in other situations.'
This conclusion, which has been fostered by prominent labor arbi-
trators and by prestigious groups such as the American Arbitration
Association and the National Academy of Arbitrators,2 overlooks the
idiosyncratic nature of labor arbitration and its crucial interrelation-
ship with unionization and collective bargaining.
Collective bargaining shapes labor arbitration and gives it power.3
The collective-bargaining relationship itself reflects the strength and
purpose of unions. It is only when unions are powerful, well estab-
lished, and responsive to the needs of their members that labor arbitra-
tion works successfully. 4 Without unions and collective bargaining, key
aspects of labor arbitration would become meaningless or counter-
productive. Therefore, proposals to utilize arbitration in various con-
texts cannot be justified by reference to the labor experience, although
the effort to do so is common.
Many of the proposals to utilize arbitration and the articles written
in its favor5 indicate that the authors misunderstand the nature of labor
arbitration. They assume that it has been universally successful and
that its success is attributable in part to the speed and informality of
the process, and in part to the practical expertise of arbitrators.6 Writers
also frequently assume that arbitration differs in a definable way from
1. See, e.g., Goldfarb & Singer, Redressing Prisoners' Grievances, 39 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 175, 314-16 (1976); Leffler, Dispute Settlement Within Close Corporations, 31 AmB. J.
(n.s.) 254, 257-61 (1976).
2. It is remarkable how little criticism of the process and how few doubts concerning
its usefulness in other contexts are found within the Arbitration Journal published by
the AAA or in the Chronicle published by the National Academy of Arbitrators. Speeches
by AAA officials and AAA pamphlets aggressively sell the process as having something
to offer in a variety of circumstances. See, e.g., Coulson, Annual Report: Responding to a
Changing World, NEws & Views FROm Am. ARB. A., Jan.-Feb. 1975, at 1, 3-6.
3. Dean Shulman stressed the interrelationship between arbitration and collective
bargaining in his oft-quoted statement that "arbitration is an integral part of the system
of self-government." Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV.
L. REv. 999, 1024 (1955). Although he stressed the value of arbitration in supporting the
process of collective bargaining, he was aware that the support runs both ways. "When
[the system of self-government] works fairly well, it does not need the sanction of the law
of contracts or the law of arbitration." Id.
4. The key role of the union in the process of dispute resolution is recognized and
described in Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF.
L. REv. 663 (1973).
5. See note I supra (citing sources).
6. See Hepburn & Loiseaux, The Nature of the Arbitration Process, 10 VAND. L. REv.
657, 659 (1957); cf. Goldberg, A Supreme Court Justice Looks at Arbitration, 20 APB. J.
(n.s.) 13, 15-16 (1965) (expressing concern that arbitration should remain speedier and
more economic than litigation).
The Yale Law Journal
adjudication or administrative decisionmaking.7 All of these assump-
tions are either questionable or inaccurate.
The establishment and legitimation of unions and collective bar-
gaining are responsible for the success of labor arbitration, not vice
versa. Labor arbitration can teach us little about the general benefits
of procedural innovation; its real lesson concerns the advantages of
giving parties greater control over the law to be applied in a certain
type of dispute. There may be something to be gained by using similar
procedures in other areas, but that cannot be predicted from the
success of labor arbitration. This article first discusses the nature of
labor arbitration. It then explores the transferability of the labor arbi-
tration model to some of the areas in which its use has been sug-
gested."
I. Arbitration and Collective Bargaining
A. The Value of Formality
Commentators tend to stress the economy and informality of labor
arbitration. Yet, labor arbitration is frequently costly, time-consuming,
and formal.9 This tendency, when noted, is usually deplored, but the
formality that labor arbitration fosters can play an important positive
7. See, e.g., Mosk, Arbitration Versus Litigation, 7 ARm. J. (n.s.) 218, 221-22 (1952);
Rehnquist, A Jurist's View of Arbitration, 32 ARm. J. (n.s.) 1, 2-5 (1977).
8. Arbitration has been advocated as a means of dispute resolution in a wide variety
of contexts, including consumer disputes, see Comment, Nontraditional Remedies for the
Settlement of Consumer Disputes, 49 TEMP. L.Q. 385 (1976), family disputes, see Coulson,
Family Arbitration-An Exercise in Sensitivity, 3 FAm. L.Q. 22 (1969), medical malpractice
claims, see Nocas, Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims, 13 FoRurM 254 (1977),
prisoner grievances, see Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 1, shareholder conflict in close
corporations, see Leffler, supra note 1, community or citizen disputes, see Symposium,
The Value of Arbitration and Mediation in Resolving Community and Racial Disputes
Affecting Business, 29 Bus. LAW. 1005 (1974), attorneys' fees disputes, see Note, Arbitration
of Attorney Fee Disputes: New Direction for Professional Responsibility, 5 UCLA-ALAsi
L. REv. 309 (1976), government-contract disputes, see Hardy & Cargill, Resolving Govern-
ment Contract Disputes: Why Not Arbitrate? 34 FE. B.J. 1 (1975), and employment dis-
putes in higher education, see Finkin, The Arbitration of Faculty Status Disputes in
Higher Education, 30 Sw. L.J. 389 (1976). In all of these articles, the labor experience is
used to support the proposal.
9. See Arthurs, Arbitration: Process or Profession? in ARBrrRAToN-1977, at 223-24 (B.
Dennis & G. Somers eds. 1978) (Proceedings of 30th Annual Meeting NAA) (develop-
ment of labor arbitration, like that of courts, was from flexibility to formality) [volume
hereinafter cited as AmrrATION-1977]; Simkin, Danger Signs in Labor Arbitration, in
LABOR ARBITRATION-PERsPECriVES AND PROBLEMS 212 (M. Kahn ed. 1964) (Proceedings of
17th Annual Meeting NAA) (citing complaints about increasing costs, formality, and delay
in arbitration) [volume hereinafter cited as LABOR ARmITATION-1964]; Straus, Charges
Against and Challenges for Professional Arbitration, in LABOR AiuiITRATION-1964, supra,
at 215-16 (same).
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role in industrial relations. To understand why this is so, it is necessary
to understand how arbitration is related to other significant processes in
labor relations.
The central process of American labor relations is collective bargain-
ing. Collective-bargaining agreements typically cover wages and work-
ing conditions for a period of several years. They are therefore gen-
erally lengthy, complex, and ambiguous. Ambiguity may arise because
the time pressures involved in negotiation prevent careful drafting, but
it may also be intentional; willingness to accept ambiguity permits the
parties to agree on a verbal formulation without having to resolve a
fundamental difference in approach. In the area of discipline, for
example, the parties typically limit the employer to actions supported
by "good cause" with full awareness that such a provision delegates
the development of appropriate standards to arbitrators. 10 A number
of disputes about the meaning of language are therefore inevitable
results of a typical agreement.
When an employee or the union feels that rights under an agree-
ment have been violated, a grievance may be filed. Once filed, the
grievance is handled by the union through shop stewards and the
grievance committee. If pursued, it is dealt with by successively higher
levels of management in consultation with their union counterparts."
At each stage, management may affirm its original decision, grant
the grievance, or offer to grant it in part. At any stage the union may
withdraw the grievance or accept a compromise. If the grievance is not
resolved through negotiation, the union has the option of demanding
arbitration. Thus, only cases that are not winnowed out by the process
of day-to-day negotiation proceed to arbitration. The agreement typ-
ically provides a technique for choosing the arbitrator 12 and declares
that his decision will be final and binding.' 3 Each party pays for his
10. See S. SLICHTER, J. HEALY & E. LIVERNASH, THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
ON MANAGEMENT 627, 653 (1960); Shulman, supra note 3, at 1006-07. Unions in particular
wish to avoid formal agreements regarding discipline standards in order to retain greater
flexibility when handling particular discipline cases. Moreover, by. disassociating itself
from the rulemaking process, the union avoids the unpopular image that it is involved
with management in setting disciplinary rules. See S. SLICHTER, J. HEALY & E. LIVERNASH,
supra, at 628-29.
11. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 120-22, 125-27 (3d ed. 1973);
C. UPDEGRAFF, ARBITRATION AND LABOR RELATIONS 137 (3d ed. 1970). See generally L.
SAYLES 9: G. STRAUSS, THE LoCAL UNION 27-33 (1953) (detailed outline of typical grievance
procedure).
12. See W. BAER, THE LABOR ARBITRATION GUIDE 22-33 (1974) (discussing typical arbitra-
tion agreements); F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 11, at 87-88 (same); C. UPDEGRAFF,
supra note 11, at 102-07 (same).
13. See A. SLOANE - F. VITNEY, LABOR RELATIONS 226 (3d ed. 1977).
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own witnesses 14 and representative. The parties share the arbitrator's
fees and the expense of the hearing. 15
The costs in time, money, and dislocation involved in pursuing a
grievance to arbitration are such that generally both sides have an
incentive to reduce the number of grievances and to settle those that
are filed without going to arbitration.' 6 The number of grievances can
be reduced to the extent that the parties understand the meaning of
the contract and try to fulfill their obligations under it. Achievement
of these goals in turn can be facilitated by use of standard language in
the contract and by recognition of decisions in previous cases at the
same or at other companies as binding. In this way, a general body of
precedent is established that guides management in administering the
contract,' 7 guides unions in deciding which cases to bring to arbitra-
tion, and guides arbitrators in making future decisions.'
The advantages of utilizing precedent make it desirable that arbi-
trators write opinions. Written opinions also serve to explain to the
losing side why it lost and may convince a rejected grievant that he
has at least "had his day in court." A written opinion helps to ensure
that the arbitrator will consider the opposing contentions and formulate
14. See American Arbitration Association, Voluntary Labor Arbitration Rule 7 (AAA
pamphlet, rules as amended effective Jan. 1, 1979).
15. The parties in a typical collective-bargaining arrangement each will have full-time
representatives who are available to deal with grievances, to attempt to resolve them, and
to prepare cases for arbitration. Arbitrators are chosen either from those known to the
parties or from lists of arbitrators submitted by the Federal Mediation Service, the
American Arbitration Association, or some other group. At the hearing, the company is
generally represented by a lawyer or a member of the personnel staff, unions generally by
a business agent but frequently by a lawyer. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 11,
at 23; C. UPDEGRAFF, suPra note 11, at 117.
16. The importance of effective settlement and screening techniques is underlined by
estimates that a grievance rate of 10 to 20 per 100 employees per year is typical. See
Feller, supra note 4, at 755 (citing S. SLICHTER, J. HEALY g- E. LiVERNASH, supra note 10,
at 698). Assuming 20 million employees under collective agreements providing for arbitra-
tion, this means two to four million grievances are filed each year, of which probably
three-fourths are potentially arbitrable. If a higher percentage went to arbitration than
is currently the case, the system might collapse.
17. In particular, management learns what it is obligated to do under the seniority
system in making promotions, what procedures to follow in discipline cases, and to what
extent it must involve the union in traditional management processes.
18. Theoretically, the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply in labor arbitration, but
in fact arbitrators follow precedent at least as carefully as courts do. An example is the
"double jeopardy" doctrine in discipline cases, which limits an employer's ability to add
to discipline once imposed. Although it does not follow inevitably from the concept of
just cause, once established, this precept has been consistently recognized by arbitrators,
subject only to common-law-type qualifications concerning suspensions pending final
determination and the possibility of separate penalties when an employee's conduct
violates two or more rules at one time. See J. GETMAN, LABOR RELATIONS 330 (1978).
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a coherent resolution. 19 It also affords an arbitrator a way to demon-
strate his intelligence, fairness, and good judgment, all of which may
help him to be chosen in the future.
If past arbitrations are to be used as precedents, the parties to a case
must be given the chance to present relevant decisions to the arbitrator.
This can best be achieved by writing briefs, which in turn is made
easier by having transcripts made of the hearing. The use of briefs and
transcripts tends to make the hearing more formal; it also tends to
increase the selection of lawyers as arbitrators.
The formal nature of the grievance system encourages greater
formality in personnel management. A significant number of arbitra-
tion cases deal with the propriety of discipline or discharge.20 To en-
hance its chances of winning at arbitration, a company needs to estab-
lish careful disciplinary procedures consistent with arbitration awards
defining the concept of just cause. Arbitrators generally insist on equal
punishment for the same offense, and they require that employees be
given advance notice of company rules and a chance to explain their
behavior before they are disciplined.21 This increases the need for a
sophisticated labor-relations staff that will respond appropriately to
arbitration decisions and creates a disincentive to dealing flexibly with
infractions, lest prior leniency be used to prove discrimination in a
discharge grievance. 22 The fact that arbitration awards will be carefully
analyzed by company and union officials in turn influences the arbi-
trator to write more carefully.
Thus, at every stage of the process, there are factors enhancing the
value of formality and legalism and making the additional time and
expense associated with these characteristics worthwhile. Efforts to
19. See A. SLOANE 8 F. WITNEY, supra note 13, at 237-38. But see Vladeck, More Ef-
fective Use of Arbitration, in NEGOTIATION-ARBITRATION '72, at 191 (1972) (Proceedings of
Seminar on Collective Bargaining) (arguing for memorandum opinions rather than long,
written opinions) [volume hereinafter cited as NEGOTIATION-ARBITRATION '72].
20. A survey of issues in cases decided by Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
(FMCS) arbitrators during 1977 revealed that of 6,935 issues identified, over one-third
(2,520) were classified as discharge and discipline issues. 30 FMCS ANN. REP. 43-44 (1977)
(Table 24).
21. See Combustion Eng'r, Inc., 42 Lab. Arb. 806 (1964) (Daugherty, Arb.) (outlining
procedures required by concept of just cause); Summers, Individual Protection Against
Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481, 502-03 (1976); cf. Getman, What
Price Employment? Arbitration, the Constitution, and Personal Freedom, in ARBITRATION-
1976, at 62 (B. Dennis & G. Somers eds. 1976) (Proceedings of 29th Annual Meeting NAA)
(analogizing arbitrator's role in enforcing employee's procedural rights to that of court
enforcing criminal defendant's procedural rights) [volume hereinafter cited as ARBITRA-
uoN-71976].22. See Feller, supra note 4, at 766-67.
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reverse these trends thus far have largely been unsuccessful, because
the trends are responsive to the goals of guidance and efficiency.23
B. The Contribution of the Private Aspects of Labor Arbitration
Labor arbitration is a mixture of public and private, voluntary and
compulsory features. The private aspects include the source of the rules
being applied and the parties' control over the selection and payment
of arbitrators. These private and voluntary features support, and are
supported by, the system of collective bargaining. They help ensure
the neutrality of arbitrators, the availability of the process, the fair-
ness of the decision, as well as obedience to awards sustaining griev-
ances; sometimes they also serve to reduce labor-management conflict.
Thus, the success or failure of labor arbitration in various significant
respects is determined by the nature of the relationship the parties
establish and by the power of the union.
1. The Collective-Bargaining Agreement and Fairness
The labor arbitrator's source of authority is the collective-bargaining
agreement. Almost all labor contracts limit the employer's ability to
discharge employees, provide for the use of seniority in the grant of
benefits and in layoff situations, and protect the work jurisdiction of
the union members in various ways.24 These clauses provide the sub-
stantive underpinning that makes an arbitrator's decision acceptable
to the employees. When agreements are deemed particularly one-sided,
harassment, wildcat strikes, and various other types of conflict fre-
quently occur.
2. Finality and Obedience
The costs of litigation and the unsettling impact of continuous dis-
agreement over labor relations act as incentives to both sides to treat
disputes as resolved once the arbitrator has spoken. In addition, the fact
that awards frequently represent compromises, as well as the feeling
that awards are likely to be equalized over the long run and that
23. Responding to complaints about delays, a prominent arbitrator, Ralph Seward,
commented: "For a time, at least-and possibly for a long time-our decisions will be the
binding law in your plants. One thing you should therefore be in a position to insist upon
is high quality in those decisions; and high quality comes at a price-in time, at the very
least." Seward, Reexamining Traditional Concepts, in LABOR ARBITRATION-1964, supra
note 9, at 243.
24. See, e.g., R. FLEMING, THE LABOR ARBITRATION PROCESS 136-42 (1965); J. GETMAN,
supra note 18, at 180-89; S. SLICHTER, J. HEALY & E. LIVERNASH, supra note 10, at 104-39,
244-79, 624-62.
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erroneous awards can be dealt with through negotiation, all have con-
tributed to the common labor-relations practice of routinely obeying
awards, even those that the losing side considers erroneous.25 This
practice developed well before it became legally difficult to upset an
arbitrator's award..2 0
Similarly, the fact that arbitration awards favorable to employees
are routinely obeyed is partly attributable to the way the collective-
bargaining agreement provides protection against the use of discretion
as a form of reprisal. For example, if the arbitrator orders an em-
ployee's reinstatement, management cannot provide him with inferior
wages or working conditions without violating the seniority clause or
his job description. 27 Moreover, reprisal would make the union more
intransigent in settling grievances and would lead to the filing of
new ones. The employer who sought to undercut the agreement might
also be faced with protest strikes.
3. Conflict Reduction and Efficiency
The existence of a grievance procedure provides a union with a
technique for putting relatively inexpensive pressure on management.
If there are a great number of grievances pending at one time, manage-
ment personnel will be occupied with grievance resolution and dis-
tracted from their other functions. Employees or witnesses will be taken
away from their normal tasks to be interviewed or perhaps called in
on meetings. If the validity of plant rules is called into question, a
decision must be made whether to suspend their operation or risk
additional grievances.
The involvement of union personnel at the lower levels will not
be particularly troublesome to the union since grievance processing is
a primary union function.28 If a large union and small employer are
25. The customary response to an award considered offensive by one or both parties
is not disobedience, but a refusal to employ the offending arbitrator in the future.
26. The enforceability of awards was not established until 1960 in United Steelworkers
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960), but many thousands of awards had
been issued and obeyed before that decision. See generally R. FLEMING, supra note 24, at
15-21 (describing widespread acceptance of arbitration in post-World War II period); S.
SLICHTER, J. HEALY &- E. LIVERNASH, supra note 10, at 747 (describing growth of arbitra-
tion and concluding that "[w]ith rare exceptions the acceptance of grievance arbitration
has ceased to be an important issue in negotiations").
27. See S. SLICHIER, J. HrALY & E. LIVERNASH, supra note 10, at 104-15 (discussing areas
in which seniority applies).
28. Professor Summers has written that the grievance process is integrally related to
the contractual bargaining process, and in effect completes the collective agreement.
Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv.
362, 389-92 (1962). Several authors have characterized the arbitration process as a tactic
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involved, the union can rely on its national staff and will therefore
have much greater resources to throw into the battle. It is for this reason
that when a strong and responsive union represents employees, the
existence of grievance machinery is likely to create an incentive for
the employer to get along with the unions and not make each issue a
battle of wills.
When the parties have been negotiating and resolving disputes over
a long period of years, a spirit of cooperation may develop in handling
grievances. In such cases union and management settle into a relation-
ship of reciprocal legitimation in which the benefits flow from the
general relationship established, rather than from arbitration itself,
which is then rarely necessary. The grievance machinery can serve as
an aid to management, because the shop steward or grievance committee
will recognize and certify the legitimacy of appropriate instructions.
Management's reliance on the union for this purpose in turn reaffirms
the union's key role in the plant. Some scholars suggest that the griev-
ance machinery serves as an aid to productivity when cooperative rela-
tions are established.2 9
4. Availability
Under the typical collective-bargaining agreement, the union con-
trols both the lower-level bargaining and the presentation of the case in
arbitration. 30 As a result, the successful functioning of the system
turns on the expertise, resources, and integrity of the union. If the
grievance committee is not familiar with the contract, it will not en-
courage the filing of needed grievances, nor will it know which ones
used to improve the union's collective-bargaining position. See, e.g., R. FLEMING, suPra
note 24, at 203-04; A. SLOANE & F. WITNEY, supra note 13, at 225.
In order to meet the conflicting goals of screening complaints and effectively repre-
senting their members, unions can sometimes use strong grievances to get the company
to compromise on relatively weak ones. The filing of grievances and the settlement and
arbitration processes are interrelated. The union may go to arbitration in order to exert
bargaining pressure and force more favorable settlements in later cases. See generally J.
KUHN, BARGAINING IN GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT (1961) (analyzing effect of grievance-resolu-
tion processes on industrial relations); Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator,
1963 Wis. L. REv. 3, 43-46 (discussing interdependence of arbitration and other union
activities).
29. See, e.g., D. BOK & J. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 266 (1970)
(grievance procedures can improve morale; "net effect of collective bargaining is to in-
crease productivity"); L. SAYLES & G. STRAuss, supra note 11, at 22 (grievance procedure
not just "a purely negative method of appeal against management," but "a continuous
process of problem solving"); cf. Brown & Medoff, Trade Unions in the Production Pro-
cess, 86 J. POLITICAL ECON. 355 (1978) (econometric data show positive impact of unioniza-
tion on productivity).
30. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 11, at 125-29; L. SAYLES & G. STRAuSS,
supra note 11, at 27-33.
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should be traded off. Substantial resources are generally required to
pay for arbitration and to hire professional counsel when necessary. An
unresponsive leadership may, through inadvertence or ill will, fail to
process meritorious grievances that are important to individuals or
groups within the union. If the union lacks the support of its members,
it will be unable to enforce favorable awards and unable to moderate
the impact of unfavorable ones at the bargaining table. Finally, a weak
union will not be able to negotiate the standard provisions that provide
job protection and ensure the use of seniority.
5. Arbitration and Industrial Peace
When labor relations are unsatisfactory, the existence of arbitration
may actually exacerbate bad feelings.3' In such circumstances the juris-
prudence of arbitration encourages management to enforce discipline
for all offenses to avoid providing arbitrators with a reason for mitiga-
tion. The union responds by filing numerous grievances that are
regularly denied in the lower steps. The union is forced to go to arbi-
tration frequently, which causes a backlog with concomitant delays in
hearing and disposition. The hearing is pervaded with an atmosphere
of hostility; it provides the parties with an additional opportunity to
berate each other. Conflicts and wildcat strikes are provoked when
management takes a disciplinary action or denies a grievance, when
arbitration is delayed, or when one of the parties considers an arbi-
trator's decision unacceptable. All of this makes the grievance ma-
chinery a cause of further tension.32
31. See R. FLEMING, supra note 24, at 203-04 (union may use arbitrations in battle
against employer); A. SLOANE & F. VITNEY, supra note 13, at 225-26 (arbitration process
politicized by both parties to obtain bargaining advantage).
The author was a permanent umpire in one institution in which relations had so
deteriorated that the union filed a grievance about management's refusal to compromise
grievances.
32. Of course, such situations cannot be the rule or the parties would reject arbitra-
tion. Arbitration is provided for in over 94% of collective agreements. U.S. BuREAu OF
LABOR STATISTICS DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1425-6, ARBITRATION PROCEDURES (1966). This
fact, however, does not provide a total measure of its overall success. To some extent the
prevalence of arbitration reflects the lack of acceptable alternatives and the potential use-
fulness of arbitration in achieving productivity when relations are acceptable. See note
29 supra. Unions want an external check on management. It would be costly to bring suit
each time they believed management violated the agreement, since this would require the
constant use of lawyers and courts. Moreover, for various economic, historic, and ideo-
logical reasons, unions seek to minimize the use of these institutions. Regular strikes
would be tumultuous and costly. The NLRB does not have jurisdiction over most breaches
of contract. Of course, if unions were totally dissatisfied with arbitration they might
agitate for special courts, but special courts would require a reversal of labor's historic
distrust of government involvement and would be unlikely to solve the problems that
unions experience with the grievance machinery. Besides, the fact that arbitration offers
another technique for exerting bargaining pressure makes it at least as attractive, from a
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The extent to which arbitration has contributed to reducing in-
dustrial strife is therefore unclear. It is generally assumed that arbitra-
tion makes resort to self-help unnecessary, 33 but it is impossible to
demonstrate this statistically on the basis of available data. Strikes dur-
ing the term of collective agreements are still quite common.3 4 In any
case it would be a mistake to attribute to arbitration a favorable impact
on labor relations independent of the basic collective-bargaining rela-
tionship.
C. Private Selection and Control and its Impact on Efficiency, Fair-
ness, and Neutrality
Collective-bargaining agreements are enforceable in federal or state
courts.35 Yet the parties prefer to utilize arbitration because of its
obvious advantages over traditional adjudication in terms of speed,
convenience, and flexibility.36 It would be possible, however, to reduce
or eliminate the advantages of arbitration in a variety of ways. Grant-
union's perspective, as other means of adjudication. Thus, it is easy to see why arbitration
is liked by unions, whether or not it reduces strikes.
From management's perspective, the issue is more doubtful. If arbitration does not
reduce strikes but instead gives the union a new source of pressure, why would manage-
ment accept it so routinely? The fact that management regularly accepts arbitration
does not mean that management always favors it. Provision for union security and
limits on discipline, work assignment, and promotion, when lawful, are pervasive in collec-
tive agreements not because they are desired by management, but because they are
sufficiently important for the union to insist on them as a precondition to agreement.
The union will moderate other proposals to achieve such provisions. In addition, for
management, most other techniques of dispute resolution have substantial drawbacks:
court cases may be costly and may involve long delays during which the law of the shop
may be confused; agencies or special courts involve government interference or over-
sight of managerial decisionmaking. Arbitrators partial to employers can be carefully
selected and their role at least partially controlled. Moreover, if the parties do not pay
for the dispute-resolution mechanism, the union may be motivated to pursue many more
grievances.
33. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960)
("A major factor in achieving industrial peace is the inclusion of a provision for arbitra-
tion of grievances in the collective bargaining agreement.")
34. Wildcat strikes are characteristically of short duration, and data from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics indicate no significant decline in the incidence of short strikes (those
lasting from one full day or shift through three full days) between 1941 and 1959. See J.
KUHN, supra note 28, at 54 (Table 1). Representatives of major industries, however, con-
tend that many more short, illegitimate walkouts occurred than were reported by the
Bureau. See id. at 53-57.
35. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596-99
(1960) (arbitration awards enforceable in federal courts); UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT §§ 11-
14 (adopted in 22 jurisdictions) (enforceability in state courts).
36. Cf. R. FLEMING, supra note 24, at 13, 18 (proportion of agreements providing for
arbitration as final step in grievance procedure increased from 8-10% in 1930s to 73%
in 1944, 83% in 1949, and 89% in 1952); A. SLOANE & F. WITNEY, supra note 13, at 226
(96% of U.S. labor agreements provide for arbitration as final step in grievance pro-
cedure).
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ing the NLRB jurisdiction over breaches of collective-bargaining con-
tracts would reduce most of the direct costs to the parties and almost
all costs to the successful grievant; it would thus eliminate the pos-
sibility that a meritorious grievance will not be heard because it is too
expensive.3 7 It would be impossible, however, for the NLRB to func-
tion as an arbitrator because NLRB procedures differ fundamentally
from those involved in labor arbitration. The entire process is con-
trolled by the agency. Once a complaint is filed, the parties control
neither the investigation nor the presentation of the case.38 They do
not choose the judge, and they cannot select the procedures.3 9 Thus,
although use of the Board's processes might provide for a more careful
investigation, it would differ greatly from the system of private griev-
ance bargaining that is so crucial an aspect of current labor relations
and that has been so significant in establishing the role of unions in
the plant.40
Many of the features of labor arbitration could be incorporated in
a system of special courts.41 What would inevitably change in an official
system is the process of private selection and payment of the arbi-
trator.42 The consequences of this change, however, are not obvious,
nor is its desirability. If, as commentators have argued, arbitral in-
dependence from the parties is essential to the integrity of the pro-
37. NLRB control over grievances would also substantially reduce the need for union
support for the grievant. This would help to prevent union incompetence and ill will
from harming the grievant's case, but it would also partially undercut the role of the
union.
38. See F. MCCULLOCH & T. BORNSTEIN, THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 85-87
(1974); B. MELTZER, LABOR LAW 96-98 (2d ed. 1977) (complaint is prosecuted by NLRB
attorney from regional office; charging party may intervene and participate, but such
participation is discouraged).
39. See B. MELTZER, supra note 38, at 96-98 (describing NLRB procedure).
40. Cf. Levine, Compulsory Dispute Settlement via Litigation: The Rhodes Labor
Court Proposal, 27 APB. J. (n.s.) 169, 169-70 (1972) (persistent opposition to compulsory
arbitration stems from notion "that any government intervention shall be voluntarily
agreed upon by the parties concerned and that acceptance of the findings or recom-
mendations of an outside party shall be optional unless the union and employer have
agreed voluntarily in advance to accept the decision of an impartial arbitrator").
41. Although the basic features of arbitration could be matched by legislatively estab-
lished labor courts, these courts would inevitably be less flexible. It would be difficult,
indeed almost administratively impossible, to set up a public system of courts that would
provide decisionmakers on whatever terms the parties chose. Once the government's money
was being spent, safeguards would be necessary to prevent financial abuse in terms of
fees and hours, and selection methods would have to be provided. The forms of opinions
would inevitably be controlled, and limitations on how the arbitrator could go about
deciding cases would inevitably arise. Thus, a switch to government-provided processes
would mean a reduction in flexibility.
42. It is difficult, but not impossible, to imagine a governmental system in which the
parties could choose their judges from a list of names supplied, and each side could
reject successive panels. Even if the parties were given the right to select special judges,
though, it seems farfetched to imagine special judges whose government salary would
depend on the selection decisions of particular patties.
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cess,43 then it would follow that protection against reprisal by the
losing side should be afforded to the arbitrator.44 Judge Paul Hays, in
his famous Storrs Lectures, 45 castigated the arbitration process because
of the arbitrator's financial dependence on the parties.46 Hays argued
that the proper model for arbitration was a strict judicial one:
The fact of the matter is that arbitration cases ought to be
decided in much the same manner as any other controversy in
which violation of a contract is alleged. The process of decision
in arbitration demands of the arbitrator much the same skills
that a judge uses when he is deciding a contracts case. 47
Hays argued that arbitrators frequently fail to live up to this stan-
dard because they are financially dependent on the parties they judge.
Hays disagreed with the majority view not about how arbitrators
should act, but about how they behave in fact. The arbitrators who
responded to Hays, and there were many,48 disagreed strongly with his
description of the process; few, if any, objected to his equation of the
judicial and arbitral role. Only a few commentators suggested that Hays
might have had a point in assuming that arbitrators decide cases so as
to further their own acceptability. 49 Those who have taken this posi-
tion have largely condemned or deplored this influence. In none of
the literature is it suggested that an arbitrator's desire to promote ac-
ceptability might affect the process in a way that is basically desirable.
However, if, as I contend, economic efficiency is promoted by arbi-
tration partly because through it the parties conclude their negotia-
tions,,1 then it is likely that the desire to maintain acceptability plays
43. See, e.g., P. HAYS, LABOR ARBITRATION: A DISSENTING VIEw 40-42 (1966); Fuller,
Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, in COLLE CiVE BARGAINING AND THE ARBITRATOR'S
ROLE 33 (M. Kahn ed. 1962) (Proceedings of 15th Annual Meeting NAA); Summers, supra
note 28, at 370.
44. At least one commentator thinks such protection is the answer and has proposed
a lottery selection process to effect it. See Silver, More Effective Use of Arbitration, in
NEGOTIATION-ARBITRATION '72, supra note 19, at 197.
45. P. HAYS, supra note 43.
46. Id. at 37-75.
47. Id. at 42.
48. See, e.g., Aaron, Book Review, 42 WASH. L. Rae. 976 (1967) (reviewing P. HAYS,
supra note 43); Meltzer, Book Review, 34 U. CH. L. Rrv. 211 (1966) (same). See generally
Getman, The Debate over the Caliber of Arbitrators: Judge Hays and His Critics, 44
IND. L.J. 182 (1969).
49. See, e.g., R. FLEMING, supra note 24, at 209-10; Meltzer, Labor Arbitration and
Overlapping and Conflicting Remedies for Employment Discrimination, in NEGOTIATION-
ARBITRATION '72, suPra note 19, at 146.
50. E.g., Meltzer, supra note 49, at 146; Silver, supra note 44, at 197.
51. See notes 28 9- 32 supra.
When the parties have in fact reached agreement concerning how a matter should be
handled, the arbitrator's function is, of course, to recognize and give effect to their agree-
ment. This is true both when the parties have specifically agreed and when they have
used language that has a fairly well-established meaning.
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a useful role in helping to achieve the resolution that the parties would
have achieved had they had the opportunity to negotiate with respect
to the issues in dispute. Such a resolution would by definition further
the goal of efficiency.
The negotiating process reflects both the relative economic strength
and the differing priorities of the parties. A typical agreement will
provide special protection for union officials, because this matter is of
considerable importance to the union and a matter of relative indif-
ference to the employer.52 Matters such as shift scheduling, which are
of importance to a company's effective functioning, are stated to be the
sole responsibility of management. Economic strength is necessarily a
factor in arbitration because it shapes the language of the collective-
bargaining agreement, which is always the starting point, and some-
times the sole basis, for the arbitrator's decision. The parties' priorities
are more difficult to ascertain. The arbitrator must pay careful atten-
tion to the clues that the parties give concerning how strongly they feel
about a particular case. My judgment is that the need to maintain ac-
ceptability makes arbitrators more attentive to such clues than judges
and more likely than judges would be to utilize them in their deci-
sion. 53 Arbitrators whose decisions over time accurately reflect the
priorities of the parties are likely to maintain and enhance their ac-
ceptability more than arbitrators who take either a more narrowly
judicial role or a more personally activist role. Thus, the process of
selection will tend to produce arbitrators and a body of arbitral prec-
edent that facilitate and extend the process of negotiation. 4
The desire to maintain acceptability makes it important for arbi-
trators not to project either a pro- or anti-union bias. As a result, this
52. Cf. J. GETMAN, suPra note 18, at 180 (clauses giving union officials time off with
pay and superseniority commonly part of union proposal); S. SLICHTER, J. HEALY & E.
LiVERNASH, supra note 10, at 22-23 (management solicitude for union officers).
53. This judgment, although difficult to prove, has been supported by experienced
labor attorneys with whom the author has discussed the matter. Indeed, several report
that planting commitment clues is a significant part of their litigation strategy. The im-
pulse to consider such clues has been acknowledged in private discussion by several
prominent arbitrators. The power of the impulse is partly demonstrated by the prevalence
of the practice of splitting awards. In reading through arbitration cases for inclusion in
a text, I was struck anew by the prevalence of this practice. See J. GETMAN, supra note 18,
at 287-97. A graphic illustration of the power of party attitudes to shape awards was
given by former Labor Secretary Willard Wirtz, who described his "pang of conscience
felt one day in the middle of a discharge hearing" when he "realized that [he] wasn't
listening to what the grievant was saying-because it had already become obvious than an
award of reinstatement without back pay would be 'acceptable' to both the company and
the union." Wirtz, Due Process of Arbitration, in THE ARBITRATOR AND THE PARTIES I (J.
McKelvey ed. 1958) (Proceedings of l1th Annual Meeting NAA).
54. The parties devote considerable effort to selecting an arbitrator whom they think
will be most favorable to them. Companies keep lists of arbitrators, which contain
performance evaluations and remarks by other lawyers and company representatives.
Unions have a less formal but frequently no less intense method of evaluation.
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desire serves to insulate the process from personal political attitudes
and to prevent it from reflecting changes in governmental policies
toward labor, as is characteristic of the NLRB. Because labor relations
are a fierce political battleground, each side should feel that it is getting
an adequate hearing on the merits in arbitration regardless of political
fluctuations.
The careful selection process also motivates arbitrators to try to
please both sides, if possible, with their decision. Thus, the split award
and the decision in which it is difficult to tell which side has won are
frequent in labor relations. Although the parties constantly insist it is
contrary to their wishes, this system of giving a little bit to each side
permits the process to achieve the results of successful negotiation.
The selection process thus helps arbitration to achieve neutrality
and, together with the collective agreement, fosters fairness and pro-
motes conflict reduction. These results, when noted, are sometimes
mistakenly attributed to arbitral "expertise." One does not have to
accept Judge Hays's unflattering view of arbitrators to be suspicious of
this explanation. It is difficult to explain how arbitrators generally
can lay claim to special knowledge about industrial relations. Most
arbitrators do not have prior management experience, and they are
most unlikely to have been union officials. They rarely have experience
working at the jobs about which they are deciding.r5 Indeed, the
selection process discourages people with practical experience in labor
relations, since anyone identified with one side is likely to be unaccept-
able to the other. Academic experience or work as a neutral party with
the NLRB or some other decisionmaking agency is common,56 but
these backgrounds do not provide knowledge of the day-to-day realities
of labor relations. Such experience is, in fact, quite similar to the
experience of judges before serving on the bench.57
55. See note 57 infra; Coulson, Certification and Training of Labor Arbitrators: Should
Arbitrators Be Certified? Dead Horses Ride Again, in ARBiTRATION-1977, supra note 9, at
178. Biographical sketches of some arbitrators are included in the index to the Labor
Arbitration Reports series. See, e.g., 51-60 LABOR ARBITRATION CUMULATiVE DIGEST AND
INDEX 577 (1974).
56. W. BAER, supra note 12, at 14-15.
57. See Feller, The Coming End of Arbitration's Golden Age, in ARBITRATION-1976,
supra note 21, at 99 ("It is certainly not true that arbitrators have a competence in their
special field that exceeds the competence of other specialized adjudicators in our legal
system.") Of course, arbitrators can gain some understanding of industrial relations by
arbitrating disputes, but the learning is distorted by the adversary process. The author's
experience as an arbitrator has not shown this learning to be particularly helpful in
writing knowledgeable opinions. Indeed, one study indicates that third-year law students
were likely to arrive at the same result as experienced arbitrators in discharge, discipline,
and contractual interpretation cases. See R. FLEMING, supra note 24, at 80-83.
Although both the courts and the NLRB have shown great deference to the ability of
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Thus, those factors that could not easily be replicated by official
governmental processes help labor arbitration to meet the needs of the
collective-bargaining process of which it is a part. Because labor rela-
tions is an important field in which both sides have considerable
financial investment, the expense of arbitration is acceptable. Indeed,
it is a relatively cheap way to police the collective agreement and make
it generally workable.58 However, in other situations unrelated to
collective bargaining, many of these same features would promote in-
efficiency and might impair the prospects for arbitral neutrality. For
parties with limited bargaining power, who cannot afford to pay for
arbitrators and do not have access to other enforcement machinery, a
system more like agency adjudication than labor arbitration would
generally be preferable. 59
D. Arbitration and Adjudication
The current surge of interest in arbitration reflects widespread dis-
enchantment with government. Arbitration is seen by some as an at-
tractive alternative to government-sponsored adjudication, with which
it is frequently contrasted.60 It is impossible, however, to consider the
relative merits of arbitration and adjudication in the abstract. Arbitra-
the arbitrator, see, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 582 (1960); Collyer Insulated Wire Co., 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 839 (1971), there is nothing
to suggest that arbitrators are more effective than judicial or administrative decision-
makers. In general, the Board's factfinding procedures may be superior. See Getman,
Collyer Insulated Wire: A Case of Misplaced- Modesty, 49 IND. L.J. 57, 60-61 (1973).
Representatives of union and management alike have questioned the competence of
arbitrators. See Jones & Smith, Management and Labor Appraisals and Criticisms of the
Arbitration Process: A Report with Comments, 62 MICH. L. REv. 1115, 1146 (1964) ("Al-
most without exception our respondents take the view that the arbitration process would
be improved if arbitrators were more competent.")
58. Although the rising cost of arbitration has long been a matter for concern, see R.
FLEIING, supra note 24, at 31 (written in 1965), the costs of arbitration still compare
favorably with those of the major alternatives: litigation and strikes, see Hepburn &:
Loiseaux, supra note 6, at 659. But cf. Benar, Woes of a Newcomer Neutral, 27 Am. J.
(n.s.) 186, 187 (1972) (some arbitrators take six months to reach decision and charge $300
or more per diem).
59. In many of the areas in which use of arbitrators has been suggested, government-
appointed decisionmaking would not present the same potential dangers as it would in
the labor context. Moreover, although arbitration is billed as less costly than official public
systems, there is no reason why this has to be so. When the parties provide their own
representatives and pay for their own judges, the reverse may be true. In labor relations,
because both sides have representatives already hired for negotiating and enforcing the
agreement, the presentation of cases in arbitration is more effective and less costly than
it would be if representatives were retained on an ad hoc basis, as they would be in other
areas.
60. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235
(1979).
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tion has no unique procedural aspects, and the two processes are
frequently indistinguishable.
Traditional definitions of arbitration focus on the private status of
arbitrators. For example, Black's Law Dictionary defines arbitration as
"[t]he submission for determination of disputed matter to private un-
official persons selected in manner provided by law or agreement.""
This definition, however, is outdated. Arbitrators today are frequently
public oficials. They are sometimes appointed and paid by the state.12
Statutes generally give them such formal judicial powers as the right to
issue subpoenas and administer oaths.63 They regularly interpret and
apply statutes or common law. 4 Arbitration decisions that are not
obeyed will be routinely enforced by the courts, frequently with less
rigorous review than that applied to formal agency decisions.7
It is also incorrect to define arbitration by the contractual or volun-
tary basis of the arbitrator's jurisdiction. Arbitration is frequently
61. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 134 (4th ed. 1968).
62. Two states that provide such a service are Connecticut and California.
Connecticut maintains panels of union, employer, and neutral arbitrators. A tripartite
panel is provided free of charge to those parties agreeing to arbitrate through the Board
of Mediation and Arbitration. The employee or his representative is permitted to designate
a labor member of the Board to serve on the arbitration panel, and the employer may
choose an employer representative. The third member is the Chairman, or, if he is un-
able to serve, the Deputy Chairman of the Board. The state compensates the arbitrators
from state funds at a statutorily fixed rate. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 31-91 to -100 (1979).
In California, cases filed in Superior Court can be referred to an arbitrator, com-
pensated from public funds, when both parties agree or on the election of the plaintiff
if he is willing to stipulate to an award of less than a certain sum. See CAL. CIv. PROC.
CODE §§ 1141.10, .20 (West Supp. 1979) (repealed effective July 1, 1979, to be replaced by
more detailed provisions, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1141.10-.32 (West Supp. 1979)).
63. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 7 (1976) (arbitrators can compel attendance of witnesses and
production of documents); UNiFoRm ARBITRATION ACT § 7 (enacted in 22 jurisdictions)
(same; power to administer oaths).
64. Both Pennsylvania and California provide for the arbitration of certain civil suits.
Pennsylvania law provides that, when prescribed by rule of court, most civil cases or
issues therein, in which the amount in controversy is less than a certain sum, shall first
be submitted to a board of three local members of the bar for arbitration. All other cases
or issues therein may be referred to an appointed judicial officer or other person by agree-
ment of both parties. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7361-7362 (Purdon Supp. 1978). For a
description of earlier Pennsylvania arbitration statutes, see Comment, Compulsory Arbitra-
tion in Pennsylvania-Its Scope, Effect, Application, and Limitations in Montgomery and
Delaware Counties-A Survey and Analysis, 2 VILL. L. REV. 529 (1957). The California
statute is summarized in note 62 supra.
65. Compare United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598
(1960) ("A mere ambiguity in the [arbitrator's] opinion . . .which permits the inference
that the arbitrator may have exceeded his authority, is not a reason for refusing to en-
force the award. Arbitrators have no obligation to the court to give their reasons for an
award.") with Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 141, 143-44 (1973) (administrative findings must be
sustainable on record made). The NLRB has also adopted a policy of deference to arbi-
trators' decisions, see Collyer Insulated Wire Co., 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 839-43 (1971), which
has been recognized by the Supreme Court, see William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters Dist.
Council, 417 U.S. 12, 16-17 (1974).
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required by law for those who wish to have some legally recognized
right enforced. Even garden-variety labor arbitration has many public
and compulsory aspects. 6 Moreover, proposals to utilize arbitration in
new situations tend to minimize the private aspects of the process. Since
the advantages of having the parties share the costs of arbitration are
largely unique to labor arbitration, and since many of the groups to
be covered by new forms of arbitration could not afford to pay arbi-
trators' fees, this feature of labor arbitration is unlikely to spread. It is
noteworthy that in almost all of the areas of current experimentation
with arbitration, the arbitrator is provided free of charge and without
elaborate procedures for selection. 7 Proposals for the extension of
arbitration tend to contrast it with a rigid model of adjudication, but
such techniques as court-appointed masters, special courts, and informal
agency decisions offer varying degrees of flexibility, speed, and in-
formed judgment. Such processes do not require relatively equal
parties and can be financed out of general revenues.
E. Summaiy: Union Organization as the Essential Element in the
Success of Arbitration
Disparities of power in the relationship that is the focus of a dispute
are bound to be reflected in the mechanism used to resolve the dispute.
When labor arbitration has been successful, it is because collective
bargaining has established a rough equality and mutual respect between
the parties. The key to changes in labor relations has been the pervasive
role of the union in promulgating and administering rules, and not in
66. It is common for the parties to select arbitrators from a list of names submitted by
either a state agency or the Federal Mediation Service. To have one's name listed requires
an official determination of suitability as an arbitrator. See Barreca, Comment, in ARM-
TRATION-1977, supra note 9, at 193. The arbitrator's powers to issue subpoenas and ad-
minister oaths are two other indications of his official status.
In negotiating a labor agreement, management is compelled to include an arbitration
clause if it wants to obtain an injunction against a wildcat strike. See Boys Markets, Inc.
v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 253-55 (1970). The union is frequently
compelled under existing NLRB doctrine to arbitrate when it prefers to submit a dispute
to the Board. See, e.g., Collyer Insulated Wire Co., 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971). The grievant
whose case is being heard is never given the choice of having his case heard by another
tribunal such as a court, or a federal or state agency. Professor Feller recognizes and
deplores the increasingly public nature of labor arbitration, because he feels this process is
inconsistent with the central role of collective bargaining in successful labor arbitration:
"to the extent that the collective agreement is diminished as a source of employee rights,
arbitration is equally diminished." Feller, supra note 57, at 109. But cf. Bloch, Some Far-
Sighted Views of Myopia, in ARTRAToN-1977, supra note 9, at 233-42 (calling for in-
creased awareness on part of arbitrators of existing statutory framework).
67. The AAA is currently experimenting with arbitration in community affairs, prisons,
Indian affairs, and energy. Arbitrators are neither chosen nor paid by the parties in any
of these situations. Telephone Interview with Gerald Aksen, Esq., Gen. Counsel AAA
(Nov. 27, 1978).
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the establishment of a particular system of dispute resolution. When
unions are powerful, the form of grievance mechanism may vary, but
it will reflect the essential nature of the relationship.
The intimate relationship between labor arbitration and collective
bargaining makes its value as a precedent for dispute resolution in
other contexts doubtful. The remainder of this essay will consider
two areas in which labor arbitration has been proposed as a model and
suggest why, in order to be successful, any system of dispute resolution
established in these areas would have to be very different from labor
arbitration. Even if it were successful, moreover, such a system would
not achieve the same goals as labor arbitration.
II. The Efforts to Transfer Labor Arbitration to New Situations
A. Nonunionized Employment
In a valuable recent article, Professor Clyde Summers suggests legis-
lation to provide job security for nonunionized workers.6 8 His goal is
to create a system for these workers that closely approximates that cur-
rently existing in the unionized sector; to do so, he suggests legislating
a "good cause" standard for dismissals, together with state-provided
arbitration.69 He argues that "legal protection against unjust dismissal
can best be built upon the standards and procedures of our existing
arbitration system" 70 and suggests that "[a] statute so structured would
give employees not covered by collective agreements substantially the
same protection as that now enjoyed by employees covered by collective
agreements." 71
Although the goals of the proposal are worthy, the obstacles to their
achievement would be formidable. In the absence of a union the goals
of obedience, availability, finality, neutrality, and efficiency would be
difficult to achieve without considerable restructuring of the process.
1. Obedience
As Professor Summers points out, obedience would be a problem
because absence of a collective-bargaining agreement makes subterfuge
possible in management's imposition of penalties.
68. Summers, suPra note 21, at 519-31.
69. See id. at 521. Under the Summers plan, the state would provide arbitrators when
the parties failed to agree, and the state would pick up some-perhaps most-of the costs
involved. Id. at 521-22. Summers believes the arbitration system currently employed by
unions provides a model for protection of nonunion workers because it has established
workable principles and procedures, and because the term "'just cause' . . . already has
been given content by thousands of arbitration decisions." Id. at 521.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 523.
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The statutory protection will be of limited value if the em-
ployer only needs to wait until he can combine disciplinary action
with economic adjustments, but the employer also must be free to
make the needed adjustments without being vulnerable to charges
of discipline by subterfuge. When there is a collective agreement,
this causes few problems because decreases or other adjustments
in the work force are largely governed by seniority provisions, and
the objective character of seniority removes any claim that action
is being taken against an individual for punitive purposes.7 2
Professor Summers's solution is to require that the employer utilize
"some objective standard" that might include "factors of age, training,
breadth of skill, past productivity, and family responsibilities, so long
as the factors are relevant, capable of objective measurement, and sys-
tematically applied."7 3
It is not easy to comprehend how the proposed system would work.
Presumably, nonunionized employers would not be required to an-
nounce their system in advance, and the weighting of such factors as
age, training, and breadth of skill would inevitably involve consider-
able discretion. Unless a great number of employees were involved,
the employer would be able to announce his conclusion without having
it subject to careful statistical scrutiny. Even when large numbers are
involved the use of a post hoc regression formula developed to ra-
tionalize the actions taken affords considerable leeway.
If an employer and an employee in a nonunionized context are to
be free to set their own terms of employment, much of the legislative
protection proposed by Summers may be offset by individual agree-
ments. One of the interesting points about union-management relations
is that protections are afforded even though the parties are permitted
enormous leeway in setting their own terms and conditions. In the
unionized context, the employer may not deal with individual em-
ployees, and therefore he may not utilize any advantage in bargaining
power over individuals to undercut the protections of the collective-
bargaining agreement.
An individual employee without union protection would be vulner-
able to harassment to force him to resign, even after a successful
grievance. The employee could not relitigate every instance of harass-
ment. As Professor Summers notes, "unfamiliarity with legal procedures
and reluctance to become involved in them will deter most employees
from litigating when the loss is not substantial."74
When a union is on the scene and representation is provided for,
72. Id. at 527.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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it is the employer who is likely to be put at a disadvantage by a multi-
plying number of grievances. Since it is important to a union to main-
tain the integrity of grievance procedures, any inclination of the em-
ployer to retaliate against the employee must be balanced against the
desirability of maintaining or developing good relations with the
union. The problems of retaliation cannot adequately be dealt with
by continuous resort to the legal process.
The NLRB's provision of legal protection against retaliation in-
cludes an experienced administrative apparatus, yet research indicates
that most discriminatorily discharged employees either do not, in fact,
return to their jobs, or, if they do, are soon forced to leave.7 5 Fear of
retaliation and harassment are the main reasons for leaving.70 Although
the Board's procedures are excellent and its formal remedial power
great, it is unable to prevent harassment or discrimination.
2. Availability and Neutrality
As Professor Summers realizes, special procedures for selection and
payment of the arbitrator would have to be devised to make arbitration
feasible outside of the bargaining context.77 An arbitrator would have
to be supplied by the state to make the process affordable to the grievant
and fair to the employer. A system of private selection would be dis-
advantageous to employees, since an arbitrator could improve his
chances of future selection by deciding favorably to institutional de-
fendants: as a group, they are more likely to have knowledge about past
decisions and more likely to be regularly involved in the selection
process.
3. Efficiency and Finality
Private selection would also probably hinder the arbitrator's ability
to work for a settlement. Judges who are not beholden to the parties,
who do not need their good will for future employment, and who are
concerned about delays and crowded dockets frequently employ very
75. See J. ATLESON, R. RABIN, G. SCHATZKI, H. SHERMAN &, E. SILVERSTEIN, COLLECIVVE
BARGAINING IN PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT 313-17 (1978) (summarizing findings of study con-
ducted by Leslie Aspin).
76. Id. at 314-15.
77. See Summers, supra note 21, at 523-32 (discussing need for framework for resolving
issues as to who has to bear costs of arbitration, what employees and employers are to be
covered, what acts constitute justifiable discipline or dismissal, how statutory procedures
are to be accommodated with procedures under collective agreements, and scope of
available remedies).
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strong tactics to force the parties to settle disputes out of court.78 A
judge, for example, may suggest that the unwillingness of either of the
parties to show flexibility will influence his decision. An arbitrator is
not in a position to exercise similar pressure, for fear that he may
antagonize the parties and jeopardize his future employment. More-
over, the arbitrator is working against his own fee if he settles the case
quickly.70 This fact is not critical in unionized labor relations, because
arbitration occurs only after a series of efforts to settle disputes. But
the lower steps of the grievance procedure would not be available under
the Summers proposal. Thus, governmental assignment of arbitrators
to cases without prior party involvement would be desirable because it
would increase the arbitrator's ability to work for a settlement.
Unless the state also provided the grievant with an attorney, he would
be at a severe disadvantage in dealing with a large institution. Provid-
ing arbitrators and representatives would make the process expensive
for society. Moreover, the lower steps of the grievance process would
be unavailable for settlements, and the development of a cooperative
relationship between the grievant's representative and management
would be highly unlikely. All of these factors would require creation
of an administrative apparatus for promoting settlements and screening
claims before providing the grievant with representation."
Since there would be less incentive for either side to treat the deci-
sion of the arbitrator as final, judicial review would be more frequent.
In addition, if the consensual elements of the process were reduced
substantially, there would be less reason for courts to accord great
deference to arbitral decisions on review. Arbitrators under this system
would have less incentive to try to please both sides, and split awards
would be less likely. Thus, since the process would lose those elements
related to collective bargaining, it would come to resemble the NLRB
more than it would resemble current labor arbitration. However it
evolved, for reasons already suggested, it is unlikely that such a system
would be as efficient as successful labor arbitration or would achieve
the same degree of obedience.
The evolution I predict under Professor Summers's proposal under-
lines the difficulty of defining arbitration outside of a particular con-
text. As already noted, the private aspects of labor arbitration-the
78. See Thibaut & Walker, A Theory of Procedure, q6 CALIF. L. Rav. 541, 557-58 (1978)
(functioning of pretrial-conference mechanism by which trial judge acting as autocratic
decisionmaker compels settlement and eliminates trial).
79. Arbitrators are paid on a per diem basis. See R. FLEMING, sukra note 24, at 37-40.
80. See Summers, supra note 21, at 524 (need to screen out frivolous claims and sug-
gesting this may be done by requiring grievant to bear portion of costs).
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private source of the rules being applied, the technique for selection
and payment of arbitrators, the interrelationship of arbitration with
the lower levels of the grievance system, and the use of arbitration as
a technique for the application of economic pressure-are all rooted in
its relation to collective bargaining. Proposals lacking these features
would produce a type of arbitration almost indistinguishable from
agency adjudication. Professor Summers's proposal and others like it
envision or would lead to decisionmakers who would be described as
"arbitrators," but would be selected by government, would apply of-
ficially established rules, and would make enforceable decisions con-
cerning the lives of people compelled to use the system.
B. Prison Disputes
The continuing interaction between labor and management gives
arbitration its shape and meaning. Group relations that are simulta-
neously adversarial and interdependent are most closely akin to the
labor experience and therefore seem to have the greatest potential for
the establishment of a similar system of dispute resolution. Perhaps the
most interesting analogy is to prisons.81 In both areas, the dominant
group depends on the cooperation of the subservient group to main-
tain control. In the absence of formal bargaining, tacit bargaining
becomes a significant process for resolving conflict. In both areas, de-
terioration of relations may lead to mutually destructive conflict. Arbi-
tration in each situation is simultaneously a substitute for combat and
for litigation.
However, because prison authorities would continue to have the
power to define the rules being applied and the scope of the arbitrator's
authority, arbitration modeled on the labor experience would lack the
features of finality, neutrality, and fairness, and would provide less
guidance and be less efficient than labor arbitration. As a result it is
unlikely to lead to a basic restructuring of relationships or to the
development of a meaningful internal system of law.
1. Current Experiments
A more favorable appraisal of prison arbitration's potential is sug-
gested in a series of articles written by people involved with current
81. Several observers have advocated that prisons implement grievance procedures
similar to those of labor. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 13 (1967); Address by Chief
Justice Warren E. Burger to the National Conference of Christians and Jews, Philadelphia,
Pa. (Nov. 16, 1972), quoted in Singer & Keating, Prison Grievance Mechanisms: A Better
Way than Violence, Litigation, and Unlimited Administrative Discretion, 19 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 367, 369 (1973).
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programs.8 2 Experiments with advisory arbitration are proceeding in
New York, South Carolina, and California prisons.8 3 Arbitration has
been used for some years by the California Youth Authority after an
experiment at the Holton School.8 4 An influential report on the Holton
School experiment described it as "exceeding all expectations for its
success." 5 The report also concluded that the experiment with arbitra-
tion demonstrated that, with only minor changes, the labor model
could be successfully transplanted to the general prison environment.80
The details provided concerning the operation, however, suggest
that the program functioned far differently than labor arbitration.
Since the arbitrator's opinions were only advisory, obedience was not
required. The awards were general in nature, and several that ap-
parently sustained grievances actually returned the issues to the staff
for the exercise of traditional supervisory discretion.
8 7
Although arbitrators under the California program have jurisdic-
tion to consider questions of institutional policy, 8 they do not appear
to have significantly challenged basic institutional regulations.89 The
one rule that bore an obvious relation to security was upheld.90 In the
one case in which the arbitrator denied the security claim, the award
was not followed.91 The report concedes that the arbitrator's "attempts
to grapple with ... grievances involving policy have not always been
successful." 92
There is another reason why it would be a mistake to attribute too
much credibility to the enthusiastic report of the first-year experiment
at the Holton School. During the first period of such a program, small
changes can be significant symbolic victories to inmates unaccustomed
to playing an officially recognized role in institutional grievances. After
a while, though, the inmates may become more demanding and the
guards more resistant.
82. See, e.g., Keating, Arbitration of Inmate Grievances, 30 AIm. J. (n.s.) 177 (1975); C.
Bethel & L. Singer, Successful Inmate Grievance Procedures: How and Why They Work
(undated manuscript from Center for Community Justice).
83. See Breed, Administering Justice: Implementation of the California Youth Au-
thority's Grievance Procedure for Wards, 10 LoY. L.A. L. Rav. 113, 125 (1976).
84. See Keating, supra note 82, at 182.
85. Keating, supra note 82.
86. Id. at 179.
87. See id. at 183-88.
88. Id. at 186.
89. Even minor changes were made tentatively and were subject to staff approval. See
id.
90. Id. at 185 ("out count" policy).
91. Id. at 189 (award upholding First Amendment right to display Nazi emblem
rejected).
92. Id. at 186; cf. Note, "Mastering" Intervention in Prisons, at pp. 1079, 1081
infra (masters face similar limitation in attempting to solve systemic problems through
case-by-case adjudication).
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2. The Differing Role of Prison Arbitration
No matter how his role was structured, it would be almost impossible
for an arbitrator in a prison to exercise the degree of oversight con-
cerning the conduct of prison officials that labor arbitrators exert over
management. Goals of fairness and neutrality would be difficult to
achieve and they would have to be redefined in the prison context.
a. Absence of Neutral Standards
An arbitrator dealing with the legitimacy of a prison rule in a tense
prison situation is in a difficult position. Arbitration would be a poor
forum for adjudication of constitutional or other legal questions93 and,
if the dispute is not to be adjudicated by applying public law, it is
difficult to develop adequate neutral standards of decision. There is
no private law, as in the case of union and management relations,
arising out of formal bilateral bargaining and contractual obligations.
There are prison rules, but these are unilaterally promulgated and
subject to change. They generally delegate considerable authority and
discretion to prison authorities. Because of the importance of main-
taining order in prison and the vulnerable position of outnumbered
guards, arbitrators have to respect regulations defining infractions
broadly and give officials broad discretion in the determination of
penalties. In the absence of official rules, the arbitrator's judgment
either must rest on traditional methods of prison governance, a "com-
mon law of the shop" that is unlikely to accord much status to the
prisoner grievants, or must involve considerable discretion and intui-
tion. Awards based on such ill-defined standards will not have the
legitimacy that comes when a decisionmaker is perceived to be apply-
ing standards not of his own making.
If he considers a prison rule improper, the arbitrator must decide
whether simply to suggest its abandonment or to suggest an alternative.
Either course of action creates problems. The former may either leave
prison officials confused about what to do or permit them to reinstate
their former policy; the latter may involve the arbitrator in questions
93. Arbitration is not a good technique for applying external law to prisons. Effective
legal decisions depend on constitutionally acceptable factfinding procedures. Unless the
procedure is fairly formal, the arbitritor is knowledgeable about the law, and both sides
are represented by lawyers, a legal issue will be neither well presented nor well decided
and thus will be vulnerable to a subsequent legal challenge. Because appeal to the courts
is available, important issues may remain undecided for a long time. Such a process would
be very expensive and time consuming. It is difficult to see any way in which such a use
of arbitration would improve on the use of special masters, which offers greater flexibility
and greater access to the authority of a federal judge. See generally Note, supra note 92.
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of administration beyond his competence. If an arbitrator became
deeply involved in creating rules, prison administrators might seek to
impose more stringent limits on his ability to overturn prison prac-
tices.94 Any arbitrator who attempted to force major changes opposed
by administrators would probably become unacceptable to the prison,
and therefore to the state, acting as the appointing authority.95
The arbitrator would also have to consider whether he should re-
quire officials to justify their conclusions about security needs and
whether it is legitimate for him to consider priorities in the allocation
of scarce resources. An activist approach might undercut official
authority and create a danger of disorder and a possibility of the prison
staff turning against the program.
b. Problems of Legitimacy
One of the major differences between prison grievance programs and
labor arbitration is that the success of the former almost totally depends
on acceptance and support by prison officials. The best-informed ad-
vocates of prison grievance systems recognize that "the attitude of the
superintendent is critical in determining whether an institution's pro-
cedure will be successful."9 Labor arbitration by contrast can function
successfully even if disapproved of by management so long as manage-
ment is willing to agree to an arbitration clause in the contract. Once
arbitration is contractually mandated, management cannot unilaterally
terminate the process and attempts to do so through bargaining would
generally provoke a strike. Prison arbitration, since it is unilaterally
established, can be unilaterally terminated.
One would therefore expect prison arbitrators to be extremely cau-
tious and reluctant even to suggest significant changes in important
rules favored by prison officials. One would also expect official limits
on an arbitrator's authority to reject prison rules. Thus, if one assumes
94. See J. KEATING, PRISON GRIEVANCE MECHANISMS 30 (1977) ("Administrators and line
staff alike worry . . . that decisions detrimental to security will be dictated by inmates
and/or by 'outsiders' acting as outside reviewers."); cf. Note, supra note 92, at 1067
("Members of the prison community who benefit from the current structure [of decision-
making] are likely to resist efforts to reduce their control.")
95. But cf. C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTIcE 398 (1978) ("Most
prison authorities have preferred to purchase order by sharing some of their power with
inmates .... )
96. C. Bethel & L. Singer, sujra note 82, at 10; accord, Breed, supra note 83, at 116
("unqualified commitment" of superintendent "a sina qua non for a successful procedure").
The acquiescence of inmates is also of crucial importance. See C. SILBERMAN, supra note
95, at 403 (prison government depends on inmate consent); cf. J. KEATING, suPra note
94, at 10-11 (importance of grievance mechanism appearing credible to inmates); Note,
supra note 92, at 1074 (judicial intervention depends for efficacy on willingness of
all parties to participate).
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that the rules currently applied do not recognize legitimate prison in-
terests, arbitration is unlikely to change this state of affairs substan-
tially.9 7 Such a system, in which the decisionmaker has greater incen-
tive to please one side than the other, is unlikely to achieve neutrality
or fairness.
c. Lack of Protection Against Reprisals
Arbitrators in prisons currently do not deal with the imposition of
penalties.98 If they did, many of the problems with respect to obedience
to awards, discussed in relation to nonunionized industries, would arise.
Prison officials would be able to avoid the general impact of unfavor-
able rulings by changing their own regulations. The successful grievant
would be vulnerable to reprisals through a variety of subsequent con-
tacts in which he would deal with the same officials.
Because of the number of situations in which prison officials make
discretionary decisions about important aspects of the prisoners' lives,
it would be difficult to prevent either the incident that led to the im-
position of punishment or the filing of a grievance from being used
against an inmate. Various forms of reprisal might be taken that would
not easily be characterized as punishment.99 In addition, it would often
be difficult to remedy the improper imposition of punishment, since
the punishment would often be administered before the grievance
machinery could operate.
In sum, introduction of arbitrators into prisons would not change
the fact that all processes will have to be subordinated to the over-
riding goal of maintaining order' °00 This goal not only limits how the
arbitrator will decide, but also what corrections officials will accept.
97. It is possible that grievances will be filed by inmates seeking protection against
other inmates. Such grievances would have great appeal in arbitration; permitting power-
ful inmates to terrorize weaker ones in violation of the rules is unacceptable. To respond
adequately, though, arbitrators would have to require stricter enforcement of prison
regulations, and this might create the perception that the process is just another technique
for imposing discipline.
98. Telephone Interview with George Nicolau, V.P. & Exec. Dir., Institute for Media-
tion and Conflict Resolution (Mar. 15, 1979).
99. See J. KEATING, supra note 94, at 11 ("Fear of reprisal is the objection to grievance
mechanisms most often voiced by inmates.") See generally C. SILBERMAN, supra note 95,
at 399 (trade-offs and bargains between guards and inmates characterize prison life);
Note, Bargaining in Correctional Institutions: Restructuring the Relation between the
Inmate and the Prison Authority, 81 YALE L.J. 726, 728 (1972) (inmates and guards interact
through "an ongoing informal bargaining process").
100. Cf. Note, supra note 99, at 729 ("[W]ithin the day to day bargaining process often
the only goal sought ... by the institution is short term surface order-the semblance that
everything is running smoothly with no official (or public) cause for alarm."); Ruther-
ford, Formal Bargaining in the Prison: In Search of a New Organization Model, 2 YALE
REv. L. & Soc. AcT. 5, 7 (1971) (describing equivalent concept of "surface placidity").
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d. Conflict with Guard Unions
The interests of higher prison officials and guards generally coin-
cide, 101 since both seek to achieve order and to minimize the possibility
of disruption. In addition, the guards have a special interest in main-
taining their own authority over the inmates. They are often union-
ized' 0 2 and they have the ability to resist limitations on their tradi-
tional powers and to insist that an arbitrator dealing with prison
grievances recognize the supremacy of their contractually negotiated
rights. When guards are unionized, they will almost inevitably have
greater bargaining power than inmates and any grievance system devel-
oped will reflect this fact. Moreover, the institution of a grievance
system for inmates is likely to serve as an incentive for guards not al-
ready organized to do so. Thus, the standards applied in resolving
prison grievances will inevitably reflect the interests and priorities of
prison guards, and arbitrators will not be permitted to exercise the
stringent control over management decisionmaking in prisons that they
have in labor relations.
3. Can the Model of Collective-Bargaining Arbitration Work in
Prisons?
Grievance machinery coupled with formal collective bargaining
would have greater potential than arbitration alone for changing the
nature of the prison environment. However, since collective bargain-
ing would have to change substantially from the labor model to make
sense in this context, it would not have the same impact it has in labor
relations.
It is difficult to determine what the potential for collective bargain-
ing is in prisons. Inmate organizations are common, but their scope is
narrow. They rarely deal with significant questions of institutional
governance and do not engage in collective bargaining leading to en-
forceable agreements. 0 3 The primary form of bargaining in prison con-
tinues to be indirect, individual bargaining of a type that favors those
most capable of causing disruption. Certain individuals who have the
capacity to create serious disorder are granted favored treatment in
101. But see J. KEATING, supra note 94, at 30 (prison staff may oppose a grievance
mechanism because it enables administrators more closely to monitor their job per-
formance).
102. See J. JACOBS & N. CRorry, GUARD UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF PRISONS 6-8 (1978)
(Institute of Public Employment Monograph No. 9).
103. Cf. Paka v. Manson, 387 F. Supp. III (D. Conn. 1974) (inmates have no constitu-
tional right to organize union).
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exchange for their cooperation in maintaining order.104 A more formal
bargaining process might create a sense of fiduciary obligation on the
part of the prisoners who engage in negotiations with prison officials.
If the tacit bargain of cooperation in exchange for decent treatment
were made explicit, more prisoners might identify their interests with
the maintenance of order, and prisons might work more efficiently and
equitably.10 5
The California Youth Authority experiment included procedures
for settling grievances prior to arbitration that might be seen as creat-
ing explicit bargaining. A grievance was first presented to a committee
consisting of two inmates, two staff members, and a nonvoting, middle-
management chairperson.'0° If the committee failed to achieve a settle-
ment, an appeal to the superintendent or the director could be taken.'
0 7
The great majority of cases did not reach arbitration, 0 8 a fact hailed in
the report as proof of "the success of ward participation and mediation
in resolving problems at the lowest level of the procedure."' 0 9 This
claim is not substantiated, however, because we do not know how the
grievances were resolved, how many were turned down by the superin-
tendent, 110 or why inmates who might have had grievances partially or
wholly rejected did not go to arbitration. Nevertheless, it seems likely
that such mechanisms constitute a form of collective bargaining in
which some prisoners or wards acting in a representative capacity at-
tempt to convince institutional officials of the wisdom of changing
policies or of satisfying individual complaints. This form of bargain-
104. C. SILBERMAN, suPra note 95, at 399; Note, supra note 92, at 1065; Note,
supra note 99, at 738-41; cf. J. KEATINO, suPra note 94, at 28 ("The principal alternative to
repression in virtually every correctional setting is a form of informal and unofficial bar-
gaining based on the mutual recognition by staff and inmates of each other's power to
make thing [sic] difficult in the event of a breach of terms.")
105. See C. Bethel & L. Singer, supra note 82, at 3. The opportunity for prison input
under the arbitration model would serve rehabilitative goals by promoting prisoner
dignity and self-respect, see Note, supra note 99, at 751-53, while remaining true to the
values of the emerging "justice model," see generally J. KEATING, supra note 94, at 23. It
could thus alleviate the sense of alienation and powerlessness fostered by the capricious
and arbitrary functioning of a system of tacit bargaining. See id. at 31; Note, supra note
99, at 741.
106. Keating, supra note 82, at 181.
107. Id.
108. Keating, supra note 82, at 182 (only six cases had been referred to arbitration);
Keating, The Justice Model Applied: A New Way to Handle the Complaints of California
Youth Authority Awards, 10 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 126, 147 (1976) (as of early 1976, with
procedure operating throughout California youth system, only one percent of all cases were
appealed to outside review).
109. Keating, suPra note 82, at 182.
110. But see Keating, supra note 108, at 146 (relief requested by grievant was granted
in whole or in part in 68.1% of cases).
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ing informs prison officials of inmate attitudes and provides an op-
portunity for rational discussion. Thus, the lot of the ordinary inmates
who normally do not have a forum for the expression of their views
may well be improved."' It is possible that the major contribution of
grievance mechanisms in prisons will not be the establishment of a
system of external review or the creation of an internal legal system,
but the provision of a means for prisoner representatives and staff to
discuss mutual concerns in an atmosphere relatively free of coercion
or confrontation."12
However, such a style of collective bargaining would not lead to
substantial change: prisoners would not be able to apply economic
pressure by withholding work if their demands were not met. Although
prisoners do have the ability to disrupt the prison through violence and
refusal to cooperate,"13 the use of such tactics would create strong
pressures from guards and the public to eliminate any explicit bar-
gaining process. Only the prospect of minimizing violence and disorder
can make collective bargaining acceptable to the public and prison
officials, 114 both of whose approval is probably necessary to the estab-
lishment or maintenance of such a program. The resources available
for prisons would not be dealt with through such bargaining, so collec-
tive bargaining cannot create additional benefits for inmates."15 Dis-
cussions might deal with how limited resources intended for prisoner
111. See Note, supra note 99, at 750 (mediation model may "serve as a vehicle for
airing grievances in public"). Mediation may thus channel the frustrated desire to be
heard that frequently underlies prison revolt. See J. KEATING, supra note 94, at 5-8 (griev-
ance mechanism necessary to avoid prison violence); Singer & Keating, supra note 81, at
376 (arbitration may serve to avoid prison violence).
112. See J. KEATING, supra note 94, at 18 ("An effective grievance mechanism can
break the log-jam of communications and provide a means of destroying the control over
information flow currently enjoyed by line staff."); Cf. C. SILBERMAN, supra note 95, at
422 (importance of communication between inmates and prison staff). The atmosphere
induced by a grievance mechanism would thus stand in marked contrast to the adversarial
climate fostered by more traditional judicial proceedings. See C. Bethel & L. Singer, supra
note 82, at 2; Note, supra note 92, at 1082-84.
113. Cf. Note, supra note 99, at 744 ("bargaining ability depends upon maintaining
the highest possible threat of disruption and violence by the inmate society").
114. See Keating, sup ra note 82, at 190 ("As the cost of violence and litigation in
corrections escalates, more and more correctional administrators, like their employer
counterparts before them, are becoming increasingly receptive to new ways for handling
legitimate grievances.')
115. Cf. Note, supra note 92, at 1067 ("public officials are often unwilling to allocate
funds necessary to provide adequate resources"); Note, supra note 99, at 736 (political
process "will provide the minimum amount of enforcement resources necessary to satisfy
its demands for security (as well as the treatment of offenders)"). Arbitration may, how-
ever, more efficiently use the resources already available to prisons. See J. KEATING, supra
note 94, at 16 ("One of the most important reasons for adopting an effective grievance
mechanism is the potential improvement in management it can bring to an institution
or program.")
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use should be allocated, but prison officials would have their own
views and the final say.
There is little reason for prison officials to place any agreement
reached in a formal contract. 116 Making the relationship contractual
implies a level of equality between inmates and officials that officials
would probably resent and that prisoners could not enforce. There
would be no important return promise similar to the no-strike clause,
and official contractual relations between prisoners and inmates might
conflict with collective-bargaining agreements between employee unions
and state officials."17 Thus one would expect the results of a bargain
to be cast in the form of an official policy statement rather than a
contract."18
Labor arbitration reflects the fact that unions under a system of
collective bargaining have a significant, almost equivalent, voice in
establishing the ground rules of industrial life. Prison arbitration, on
the contrary, must recognize that correctional policy requires acknowl-
edgment of the supremacy of prison officials and of the need for main-
taining order. Because of this fact, the grievance system would not
stand neutral between those in power and those who bring grievances.
A technique of dispute resolution based on interpreting agreed stan-
dards cannot simply be transferred to a situation of paramount in-
equality that lacks an accepted procedure for establishing mutually
acceptable rules. 19
116. See Keating, supra note 82, at 186 ("The absence of a contract in any meaningful
sense in corrections means that the definition of a 'grievance' is virtually unlimited.")
117. The conflict is different when an employer deals with two unions. Each union
would usually have its exclusive areas of jurisdiction. In prisons, both groups would be
dealing with the same matters. In addition, when conflict existed, inmate groups could
not claim equality.
118. Cf. Keating, supra note 82, at 185 ("Characteristically, awards in policy cases have
outlined the framework of a suggested new policy and recommended its adoption on a
'pilot' basis for a specified period of time.")
119. Arbitration has been suggested for certain disputes between individuals who do
not have a continuing relationship, such as lawyers and clients. In such circumstances, the
labor model is obviously inapposite. There is no need for precedent, or a careful selection
process, no point to having the parties pay for the arbitrator, and no reason for the
arbitrator to decide in terms of the parties' priorities or to give split awards. There is
also no reason, other than cost to the parties, to avoid appeals, and no collective agree-
ment to ensure obedience to an award requiring a further course of conduct.
Arbitration of such cases may nevertheless have advantages over formal adjudication.
It may be similar to a small claims court, with the additional advantage of special ex-
pertise. On the other hand, arbitration by nonlawyers may involve the loss of procedural
regularity and legal rights. If lawyers are used, the difference from a special court seems
minimal.
Some of the disputes that the AAA is attempting to deal with through a combination
of arbitration and mediation are between individuals or groups who have a continuing
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Conclusion
To understand labor arbitration one must understand its complex
relationship with other aspects of collective bargaining. Through labor
arbitration the parties continue and refine their bargaining. Their
agreement takes on a more precise meaning, and issues not dealt with
during formal negotiations are resolved in a way likely to recognize
their interests and priorities. This process is enhanced by the system
of private selection of arbitrators. The private aspects of the process
make arbitrators less able than judges to facilitate prelitigation settle-
ment, but this is relatively unimportant because settlement is achieved
through the lower steps of the grievance system.
The constant focus on the informality of arbitration is misleading.
The procedures used vary, but they frequently involve presentation
of cases through lawyers, oaths, subpoenas, transcripts, briefs, and care-
fully written awards following a common form and citing precedent.
The entire process serves to legalize the administration of a unionized
enterprise to a remarkable extent.
Labor arbitration also serves as a mechanism by which unions that
have given up the right to strike can apply pressure on employers dur-
ing the term of an agreement. This feature, which increases the value of
arbitration to unions, occasionally makes it a source rather than a
substitute for conflict.
The collective-bargaining relationship and the collective agreement
give considerable power to arbitration awards. Primarily they provide
the substantive standards to be applied and make the results accept-
able to the parties. Because both sides develop a strong interest in the
smooth functioning of the process, arbitration awards are routinely
obeyed and infrequently challenged. The other provisions of the agree-
ment serve to protect the integrity of the process. Because they limit
managerial discretion they make it difficult to undercut the impact of
an unfavorable award through retaliation.
relationship. In such cases, arbitration is suggested because the currently available legal
remedies are too adversarial and involve delays permitting the issues to smolder.
The issue being addressed by community dispute-resolution programs is an important
one because it involves an attempt to harmonize the exercise of formal adjudicatory
power with efforts at conciliation. For the arbitrator to be successful, he must be able to
deal with the legal aspects of the case while also utilizing his position to promote an
acceptable settlement. This is not a role commonly played by labor arbitrators. There is
little institutional expertise about how the two roles can best be combined in individual
cases, nor is there any reason to believe that private processes lend themselves to such an
approach better than public decisional processes. The labor-arbitration process, with its
statements of issues, adversary proceedings, professional representatives, formal opinions,
and the constant contractual reminder to the arbitrator to limit himself to interpretation
of the agreement, provides a poor means of resolving personal conflicts.
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The interconnection between labor arbitration and collective bar-
gaining means that grievance systems in other situations without this
feature will be vastly different. The private aspects of labor arbitration
that have served to make it attractive to commentators are likely to be
a hindrance in nonunionized contexts in which collective bargaining
does not take place. Protection for nonunionized workers, for example,
probably requires more direct government involvement, and even then
it is unlikely to achieve the same results as are achieved by the combina-
tion of collective bargaining and labor arbitration in the unionized
sector.
Prisons have some of the attributes of labor relations and some
preliminary efforts to establish grievance mechanisms have been un-
dertaken. Such mechanisms have the value of permitting inmates and
officials to engage in a useful process of quasi-bargaining in dealing
with grievances, but the process is, and will eventually remain, signif-
icantly different from labor arbitration. Any collective bargaining in
prisons must recognize the overriding need for security and the fact that
a prisoner's relationship to institutional officers is not intended to be
one of equality.
In prison and elsewhere, arbitration has developed along lines dif-
ferent from the labor experience. The idiosyncratic development of
arbitration experiments might lead some to conclude that one need
not be overly concerned with the inappropriateness of the labor model.
Each new form of arbitration may be expected to develop according
to the special needs of the particular area. If the labor model helps to
inaugurate more flexible systems of justice, a useful purpose is served,
even though the model is inapposite and the new processes are less
successful in achieving various goals.
A realistic understanding of labor arbitration is nevertheless im-
portant. It helps to set a realistic agenda for reform because it reminds
us that systems of dispute resolution can play only a limited role in
affecting relationships that are shaped by powerful economic and social
forces. Throughout labor relations there is a tendency to exaggerate
the importance of adjudication. Those who devise the rules and ad-
minister the process are the ones who are most likely to describe their
work in print and to exaggerate its significance. Their roles are easier
to study for legal scholars and political scientists than are the in-
tricate processes of union organization, contract negotiation, and griev-
ance settlement. This gives greater salience to the role of decision-
makers and helps create a body of partially informed opinion focusing
on one part of a complex process. Labor arbitration has been particu-
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larly vulnerable to this problem. Much of the writing describing and
evaluating it has come from practitioners whose professional egos are
intertwined with the success of the process. In addition, prestigious
groups such as the American Arbitration Association and the National
Academy of Arbitration, through their publications, conferences, and
reports, have acted as advocates for arbitration. Their literature has
suggested that a clear line exists between arbitration and adjudication;
it has also suggested that labor arbitration has been more successful in
achieving industrial peace than any careful investigation suggests. In
claiming success for labor arbitration, these groups have tended to
overlook or downplay the crucial significance of union organizing and
the collective-bargaining context.
